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Abstract: The current article demonstrates how during transition from a totalitarian system to 
democracy in Romania, democracy could be shaken by the fact that the Government takes on 
Parliament’s attributes regarding its powers to legislate. In other words, the Parliament becomes an 
“annex” of the Government. Normally, one could assume that, by virtue of the cooperation and 
solidarity between the Parliament and the Government, the more solid the parliamentary majority is, 
the less the Government would need to interfere with the law-making process of the Parliament. But 
the same solid majority in the Parliament could also be a guarantee that an Emergency Ordinance 
adopted by the government remains in force without even being democratically debated in the 
Parliament. The ordinances with potential to divide the society are not passed through the Parliament 
so that they cannot be challenged by the opposition or by the Presidency at the Constitutional Court. 
Thus, at the 28th anniversary of the transition of Romania from communism to democracy - we can 
observe an increase in government power in the field of direct regulation. The Parliament is also 
actively involved in this “game” by not contesting this transfer of duties. The paper analyses and 
compares the number of Emergency Ordinances and simple Ordinances adopted by the Government 
and the number of laws adopted by Parliament and the context in which they were passed.  
Keywords: political power; law-making; GEO; Law-making; Democratization; Parliament; 
Government 
 
1. Introduction 
During twenty-eight years, Romania has gone through a difficult transition (Pasti, 
(1995), Barbu, (1999), Eyal, Szelenyi & Townsley, (2001), and others). As in any 
transition, “theories do not fit with practice” (Pasternak, 1957, p. 314), and laws are 
applied, many times, according to the power of understanding of those who have to 
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apply them, and thus the legislator is often in the position to issue laws to solve one-
off situations.  
For twenty-eight years in Romania, laws were given according to the model of “fire-
fighters”, that is, laws are given in order to eliminate certain punctual and individual 
conflicts and when the “fire” bursts elsewhere, another small correction is applied 
only in that field. Important and vast laws, such as the Laws of Justice or the Law of 
Education - could not be drafted, debated and voted by all the actors involved in the 
legislative process. Because visions were so different, because each side wanted 
something else and sought to maximize its benefits - they were given by assuming 
responsibility. 
However, these laws of accountability of the governments have become, over the 
last years, a reason and a good justification when the new Governments handed over 
other GEOs that radically changed them. 
The Law on National Education, which entered into force in 2011 was modified until 
the summer of 2018 by means of more than 60 GEOs comprising over one third of 
article changes.  
The debates in the Parliament involved the Ordinances, not the initiatives of the 
Members of Parliament. The debates were not concluded in view to coincide with 
the interests of all actors involved (Antonovici, 2017). In the last seven years, the 
practice of “assuming” some laws in Parliament was forgotten. However, the 
government has made an excess of power and turned Romania into a country in 
which extreme, emergency and crisis situations were happening almost every week, 
if not even every day. This is the only conclusion to be drawn if we look at the 
number of situations in which the Government adopted an Emergency Ordinance. 
These GEOs must only be given in emergency situations, but they have become a 
habit for post-communist governments. This practice is a democratic one at its core, 
but if a Government abuses, it is moving further away from democracy, because it 
restricts the access of other actors (opposition, civil society, social partners, trade 
unions, media, etc.) to actively contribute to the adoption of a law. For example, the 
emergency of such measures was justified by Romania’s membership to NATO or 
the EU. 
As the Parliament could not mobilize to approve certain laws that had to be put in 
accordance with the international law, the Government was the one who, through the 
GEO, “solved” the problem. 
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Despite all these, we must ask ourselves how many compromises democracy can 
accept. 
Shortening the road of a law by approving a GEO would turn the Parliament into an 
institution for mere embellishment? 
The paradox is that the stronger the parliamentary majority is, the more “courage” 
the Government has to adopt a GEO. 
Thus, the parliamentary opposition is no longer allowed to come up with criticism 
and amendments to a particular bill before it produces its effects. 
We must also keep in mind that after the Romanian revolutionary moment of 
December 1989 there was a real need in Romania to quickly adopt a new law and 
then there was the need to adapt the Romanian legislation to acquis communautaire 
for the integration of the country in the European Union. 
All these realities created the “super-power” of the Government in terms of 
legislation by simple ordinances or emergency ordinances. 
Therefore, with every taken right certain (electoral and legal) responsibilities arise 
as well. 
Thus, during the last twenty-eight years, the Parliament was only called to transform 
this kind of initiatives into ordinary laws (Catrina, 2009, p. 53). 
 
2. The Limits of Political Power in Romania from an Institutional and 
Legal Point of View 
2.1. Who are the Legislators in Romania According to the Constitution? 
According to Article 74, paragraph 1 of the Romanian Constitution, the legislative 
initiative shall, as the case may be, belong to the Government, Deputies, Senators or 
at least 100,000 of citizens with voting rights.  
According to par. (3) the Government exercises its legislative initiative by 
transmitting the draft law to the competent chamber to adopt it as the first notified 
chamber. 
Article 115, paragraph (4) clearly states that “the Government may adopt Emergency 
Ordinances only in exceptional situations whose regulation cannot be postponed, 
having the obligation to motivate the emergency within their contents.” 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                       Vol. 10, no. 1/2018 
 
8 
The Emergency Ordinance enters into force only after being debated in emergency 
procedure at the competent chamber of the Parliament and after its publication in the 
Official Journal of Romania. 
Thus, a GEO can come into effect in just a few days or hours. The ordinance 
produces effects as soon as the above conditions are met. 
Normally, a legislative initiative has a difficult journey until it becomes law. 
Sometimes it can pass even a year until it finally becomes law.  
I shall only mention a few steps until it is promulgated: public debate, receiving 
opinions from the Legislative Council and the Economic and Social Council, debates 
in the specialized commissions of the Parliament, debates and votes in the 
committees of the two chambers etc.) 
The Conditions for Adopting an Ordinance, According to the Constitution, are: 
a. The existence of an extraordinary situation - the existence of an objective, 
measurable situation that is independent of the Government’s will and that is 
endangering the public interest (Decision No. 1008 of 7 July 2009 of the 
Constitutional Court).  
The extraordinary reasons that justify the issuance of the GEO must be assessed 
according to the time of the issuance and not depending on factors that occur at a 
moment later in time. 
b. The existence of an emergency and its motivation included in the GEO 
(to exist and to be described as specifically those situations listed in the Preamble to 
the Emergency Ordinance and its substantiation and explanation on why these 
circumstances constitute an emergency). 
According to the Decision no. 421 of 9 May 2007 of the Constitutional Court, “the 
emergency of the regulation is not equivalent to the existence of the extraordinary 
situation, the operative regulation can be achieved by the way of the ordinary 
legislative procedure”. 
c. It cannot be postponed - not to be confused with the extraordinary situation, and 
thanks its exceptional circumstances, the situation requires the adoption of 
immediate solutions in view of avoiding serious harm to the public interest. 
  
ISSN: 2068 – 5459                                                                  ADMINISTRATIO 
 
9 
2.2. Who Legalizes de Facto in Romania? 
Taking into account the legal provisions on the attributions of each institution 
regarding legislation, we would expect that the number of Emergency Ordinances 
and Government Ordinances is very small compared to the number of laws. These 
should only be given in “emergency” situations or during parliamentary holidays. 
The reality however is very different: one third of the laws published in the Official 
Journal of Romania are Ordinances and Emergency Ordinances. 
Table 1. The total number of GEOs and GOs approved by the Government in 
comparison with the number total of Laws between 1990 and 2018
1 
The total number of GEOs and GOs adopted 
by the Government 
4668 
The total number of laws adopted by the 
Parliament 
8952 
 
 
Figure 1. The proportion of GEOs and GOs vs. number of LAWS between 1990 and 
2018 
It is worth mentioning that for 2018 we centralized the data before 9.11. 2018. 
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Series1, The 
total no. of OUG 
and OG adopted 
by the 
Government, 
4668, 34%
Series1, The 
total no. of law 
adopted by the 
Parliament, 
8925, 66%
The total no. of OUG and OG in 
comparison with total no. of law 1990-
2018.
The total no. of OUG and OG adopted by the Government
The total no. of law adopted by the Parliament
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Figure 2. The proportion of GEOs, GOs and number of LAWS for each year 
If we add the number of GEOs to the number of GOs we shall see that in 1999 and 
2000, their number has exceeded the number of laws passed by Parliament.  
A first assumption would be that the Government was more active or even more 
authoritarian. 
The reality however is that the Government has bypassed Parliament in view to 
impose its own legislative changes. 
 
The total no. of OUG adopted by the Government
The total no. of  OG adopted by the Government
The total no. of law adopted by the Parliament
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Figure 3. Number of GEOs and GOs vs. number of LAWS between 1990 and 2018 
According to the above chart, we should keep in mind that some governments have 
turned to a “new strategy”, which I shall call the “matrioşka ordinance”. It’s about 
an ordinance that can change dozens of different laws but still counts as an ordinance. 
It is a strategy to hide the large number of legislative interventions through a single 
GEO.  
With this artifice, the Government has avoided the critics of the civil society 
regarding the large number of approved EGOs. 
The large number of ordinances issued by the Romanian Governments was 
highlighted either by press1 or by civil society representatives. 
                                                             
1 They were publishing an interesting title from the publication Romania Liberă, from 28.07.2014: 
Romania, in an emergency? Ponta gave an ordinance every 72 hours, accessed on 30.08.2018 - 
https://romanialibera.ro/special/dezvaluiri/romania--sub-stare-de-urgenta--ponta-a-dat-o-ordonanta-
la-fiecare-72-de-ore-344443. 
The total no. of OUG and OG adopted by the Government
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For example, the “Capital” wrote on December 28, 2017: “EXCLUSIVELY 
Romania, governed by “EMERGENCY”: Tudose, the Prime Minister with the most 
emergency ordinances issued in the last 10 years”1. 
The article drew attention to the fact that “the Romanian Government has issued 
nearly 1,000 Emergency Ordinances in the last 10 years, which means that our 
country was in a constant exceptional situation, considering that at least two 
emergency ordinances have been issued weekly”. 
The publication mentions that an average, over the last ten years analysed, would 
look as follows: an ordinance of emergency was issued every three days. This would 
prove that Romania was in a permanent position of exceptional situations or crisis.  
The question is - whose crisis? Of the Government? Of the Parliament? Or of the 
country’s socio-economic situation?  
Orders should be adopted in extraordinary situations whose regulations cannot be 
postponed. The logical question is: who actually has the power in Romania? And 
this can only be found out by knowing who has the power to enforce certain laws. 
If the parliamentary majority has full control over all MPs and the Government, 
which it votes and supports, it can pass certain legislative initiatives in an emergency 
procedure through the Parliament. 
Thus, a legislative initiative can become law in only a few months: all the procedures 
are hurried, it goes at the top of the list of priorities and it appears faster on the 
agenda. 
The voted initiative may also be appealed to the RCC by the parliamentary 
opposition (if it manages to collect a certain number of signatures from Members of 
Parliament and draft a referral) or be turned for re-examination by the Presidency or 
it can even be attacked by the President of the Republic to the RCC. 
(2) If the parliamentary majority is fragile and does not have real power (meaning 
real authority) over the Government - the latter will impose its own visions through 
the GEOs. 
They enter into force shortly after being published in the Journal of Romania of 
Romania. Practically, they become applicable laws in a few days without a 
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accessed on 26.07.2018. 
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parliamentary debate ahead. The parliamentary debate can take place after they have 
already produced their effects. 
Most of the time, they pass silently by the first decision-making chamber (without 
debate), and are postponed for debate in the second chamber if they are expected to 
have a great potential for public scandal.  
There is the case of GOs that have done their effect, the laws they have modified 
have long been abrogated, and still, they have not yet completed their parliamentary 
path. This technique was used by Governments when important changes to laws were 
passed and they did not want to get involved in a real debate. 
It should be noted that while the draft laws can be attacked at the RCC before they 
come into force and before they can produce any real effects, the GEOs can only be 
attacked by the Ombudsman, but only after they have been approved by the 
Government, that is, after they have entered into force! And this is extremely rare. 
Often, the Ombudsman is of the same political colour as the Government and “does 
not see the irregularities in the GEO”. 
At the same time, the role of Members of Parliament in adopting laws is somehow 
misplaced. If a rigorous analysis is to be made, we could see that the opposition 
cannot pass more than 10% of its proposed projects while the majority 20%. 
Deputies and senators also become “instruments” in the hands of the Government 
and the parliamentary majority holding the power to vote on government priorities. 
 
3 The game of Institutions that Genuinely have the Legislative Power in 
Romania 
When we talk about power in social sciences we talk about “the ability of individuals 
or groups to impose their own interests and concerns, even when others oppose” 
(Giddens, 2000, pp. 369-369). In this context, governments and the parliamentary 
majority are the ones who have the necessary tools in light to impose their own 
vision. 
The first instrument of the two entities is the “Governance Program”. It becomes a 
law when investing the Government and it is supposed to be the common purpose 
towards which the Government and the Parliament will work. However, the entire 
governance program may also become the reason for which the Government will use 
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its own attributes to invoke the “emergency” in adopting certain legislative acts, 
leaping over Parliament. 
They can always say they have resorted to the Emergency Ordinances to fulfil the 
promises of that program, as the Government has been voted by the parliamentary 
majority and also benefits from the majority’s “legitimacy” in Parliament. In this 
case, we can talk about a government that has the power to “do”, to achieve some 
results and the power of Parliament “on” (Boudon, 2005, p. 231) of the same 
Government. 
It is interesting to see if the power of Parliament is a “coercive” or “consensual” one 
as defined by Friedrich or Locke (apud Boudon, 2005, p. 235). On the other hand, 
there is no power without resources.  
If the Government has resources to fulfil the promises of the governance program, 
the parliamentary majority has the power and tools to stop or encourage certain 
measures. Here we can talk about a balance of power. If the interests of the two 
powers do not overlap, one of them will have to give up and usually it will have to 
be the Government, because the Parliament has at any time an instrument to dismiss 
a government through a censure motion (In Romania there was a case - the 
Government of Grindeanu- when the parliamentary majority resigned its own 
government through a motion of censure). This type of conflict between the 
parliamentary majority and the head of the government is more likely to occur when 
the prime minister is different from the head of the party.  
Whenever there is a “conflict” (in the sense of Lukes apud Boudon, 2005, p. 239), 
either between the Government and the parliamentary majority, or between the 
Power (composed of the Government and the parliamentary majority) and the 
opposition or civil society or between the party head (the parliamentary majority) 
and the government - the one that settles the score is the parliamentary majority in 
the upcoming elections. 
Law-making is a challenge for the coalition (Lanny, 2004, p. 457), especially if it is 
a fragile one. Ordinances and draft laws are negotiated for a long time and are placed 
on the public agenda only after there is a consensus within the majority. Law making 
inherently involves cooperation and compromise by parties with divergent political 
objectives in certain situations. 
As we know, according to most theories of political science and sociology, any 
political power needs “legitimacy”. The first step is the popular vote, then the 
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fulfilment of promises in the electoral campaign and again the approval of the 
population by vote or other forms of support or rejection (such as polls, public 
support/protests). Any Government needs support from the parliamentary majority. 
Firstly, for the government’s investment vote and then votes to support the 
Government in any simple motion or censorship motion. Whenever losing the 
support of the parliamentary majority, the Government may be dismissed. 
That is why there is a need for a balance in the exercise of power and a continuous 
negotiation with the Members of Parliament from the governmental arch. As we see 
in the above tables, all governments have turned to Emergency Ordinances. 
If in the early 1990s they were more reluctant because of the totalitarian past, with 
the passing of the years they have learned to impose their own projects through 
Emergency Ordinances. This gave them two major advantages in the front of 
opposition: they applied immediately and they were very difficult to challenge. 
In addition, they assumed a public policy in its entirety. The opposition could not 
say that it was a joint effort, that they worked in Parliament and gave a good law. 
The only possible option of the opposition was to challenge those public policies 
from the point of view of communication as abusive, bad or undemocratic. 
 
4. Conclusions 
As we have seen, taking into account the social and economic changes at national 
and international level, Romania needed an instrument through which legislation 
could change more quickly. Thus, Emergency Ordinances and (simple) Government 
Ordinances have been transformed from “crisis/exceptional instruments” into 
“force/ordinary” instruments. As a result, the Parliament's attributions regarding 
legislation have been emptied of content. 
In a real and very objective way, in a country that relies strictly on democratic values 
and not on the interest of ruling parties, the GEOs would only be used in emergency 
situations. In other words, the GOs should only be used when the Parliament is 
unable to legislate. It can be the case when there are extreme situations or when the 
Parliament is dissolved. 
In all other cases, the Parliament may adopt, by means of emergency procedures any 
laws it wants. It is true that it will not enter into force in a few days, but within a few 
months any legislative initiative can become law. At the same time, the Government 
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also has other instruments provided by the law to solve finance or funding problems 
for certain projects, such as GHGs. In order to try to re-enact parliamentary 
attribution, the political class could take into consideration amending the 
Constitution in order to eliminate the possibility for Governments to approve the 
EGOs. The Romanian society is probably not ready for such a challenge at this 
moment. 
In addition, if all parliamentary procedures were respected - in many cases - the 
Governance Program could not be fulfilled, and there would be other subjects on the 
public agenda, other than those related to Government actions. Elections for the 
Parliament are once every four years, which means that time is limited, and the 
parliamentary majority will not be able to give up an instrument that will allow it to 
change legislation in a less costly way as time and image. 
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